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The President’s Role in the Administrative 
State: Rejecting the Illusion of “Political 
Accountability”
by KEVIN BOHM*
Introduction 
Near constant attention is focused on President Donald J. Trump—
errant tweets routinely enflame debate over the actions of his 
administration.1  The President’s blustering language may endear him to his 
devotees, but his behavior often draws wider scrutiny.  Even the nature of 
his tweets and his blocking of followers on Twitter is litigated.2  Though the 
President would likely disagree, a high level of scrutiny is not unique to the 
Trump presidency.  Each administration has had its critics and drawn the ire 
of their political opponents.3  But even in the midst of spotlight and scandal, 
the government must govern—or at least attempt to do so—as political 
hyper-polarization and gridlock threaten to derail its operations.  In times of 
political gridlock, administrative agencies must continue to function and 
keep the government operating.  But, amidst the gridlock, may the President 
bypass the legislative process and direct agencies to take specific actions?  
And if so, what would justify such unilateral decision making? 
        *     University of California, Hastings College of the Law J.D. Candidate 2019.  I am greatly 
indebted to Professor Reuel Schiller for his encouragement and guidance.   
 1.  See Maggie Haberman, Glenn Thrush, and Peter Baker, Inside Trump’s Hour-By-Hour 
Battle for Self-Preservation, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 9, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/09/us/ 
politics/donald-trump-President.html; Andrew Buncombe, Donald Trump one year on: How the 
Twitter-President changed social media and the country’s top office, INDEPENDENT (Jan. 17, 
2018), http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/us-politics/the-twitter-President-how-
potus-changed-social-media-and-the-presidency-a8164161.html.  
 2.  John Herrman & Charlie Savage, Trump’s Blocking of Twitter Users Is Unconstitutional, 
Judge Says, N.Y. TIMES (May 23, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/23/business/media/ 
trump-twitter-block.html. 
 3.  See Alicia Parlapiano & Wilson Andrews, Limits on Presidents Acting Alone, N.Y. TIMES
(Jan. 20, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/01/20/us/politics/Presidental-executi 
ve-action.html.
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For some time, direct presidential control of administrative agencies has 
been the subject of debate among academics.4  As the discussion of the 
president’s authority to direct specific actions has evolved over time, the 
justification citing to the chief executive’s “political accountability” to the 
broad American electorate most notably came to center stage in Elena 
Kagan’s 2001 article entitled Presidential Administration.5  As discussed 
below, the ability of a President to specifically direct administrative agencies 
is in tension with the foundational American principle of separation of 
powers.  Furthermore, the notion of political accountability is at best a 
precarious attempt to balance normative expectations of what a President 
ought to do with what Congress intended his role to be. 
Article II of the United States Constitution gives the executive branch 
the authority and power necessary to carry out and enforce the law, vesting 
“[t]he executive Power . . .” and obligates the President to “take Care that 
the Laws be faithfully executed.”6  The skeletal nature of the Constitution 
means that it merely outlines the scope of presidential power in broad 
strokes.7This vagueness leaves much room for debate and political punditry 
with respect to the President’s obligations and limits. 
The Constitution gives a smidge of specificity with respect to 
administrative agencies in Article II, Section 2: “[t]he President . . . may 
require the Opinion, in writing, of the principal Officer in each of the 
executive Departments, upon any Subject relating to the Duties of their 
respective Offices . . .”8  There is no doubt that a President sets the policy for 
his administration, and may oversee agency operations, but what is the extent 
of his interference with an agency’s functions?  Is the President entitled to 
specifically dictate an agency action absent clear constitutional or statutory 
authority? 
There is a mountain of commentary about presidential power and the 
President’s relationship with the administrative state.9  Debates of 
constitutional authority and concerns over the delicate separation of powers 
permeate the academic discussion of the presidency.10  Numerous theories 
 4.  See infra note 10.   
 5.  See infra note 73. 
 6.  U.S. CONST. art. II, §§ 1, 3. 
 7.  See Robert V. Percival, Presidential Management of the Administrative State: The Not-
So-Unitary Executive, 51 DUKE L.J. 963, 967 (2001). 
 8.  U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.  
 9. JERRY L. MASHAW, ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: THE AMERICAN PUBLIC LAW
SYSTEM 302 n.2 (5th ed. 2003). 
 10.  See, e.g., James F. Blumstein, Regulatory Review by the Executive Office of the President: 
An Overview and Policy Analysis of Current Issues, 51 DUKE L.J. 851 (2001); Peter L. Strauss, 
The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers and the Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM.
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of “presidential control” have attempted to develop a constitutional 
justification for the chief executive’s ever-growing entanglement with the 
administrative state, and to defend the current administrative organization as 
being consistent with the intent of our government’s structure.11  Tracking 
this debate provides an opportunity to survey the conversation among 
prominent academics; and in doing so, it is useful to recognize that this 
debate does not take place in a vacuum.  As in any discipline, legal 
discussions are subject to the influence of broader societal changes, the 
crossing-over of ideas from other disciplines, and public sentiment at large.12
Placing presidential control theories and critiques in the context of their 
intellectual and historical background may add a useful lens through which 
to view and understand them and help articulate the spirit of the time. 
The discussion sparked by Supreme Court Justice, and former Solicitor 
General Elena Kagan’s indisputably influential article, Presidential
Authority, led to numerous critiques.13  Kagan’s prominence, and the fact 
that her article is widely cited, makes her work an excellent choice to focus 
on.14  In her article, Kagan analyzed President Bill Clinton’s use of directive 
authority to guide agency actions that furthered his policy agendas.15  After 
describing the history and development of presidential oversight of 
administrative agencies during the Reagan, Bush I, and Clinton years, Kagan 
argues that the increased use of executive authority for agency oversight and 
intervention is permissible, beneficial, and desirable.16  Though she does not 
embrace a unitarian view of executive power, Kagan nonetheless defends a 
President’s ability to assert control and direct the administrative state by 
relying on the doctrines of statutory interpretation and a normative “political 
accountability” argument.17
This note begins with relevant highlights from constitutional and 
administrative law pertaining to the subject of presidential control followed 
by an overview of the main aspects of Kagan’s theory to orient the 
L. REV. 573, 649 (1984) (explaining that Congress can delegate decision making authority to the 
agency rather than the President) [hereinafter Strauss 1984]; Peter L. Strauss, Overseer, or the 
Decider? The President in Administrative Law, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 696 (2007) (the President 
has no decision making authority with respect to an agency unless congress explicitly gives him a 
role) [hereinafter Strauss 2007]. 
 11.  Id.
 12.  See DANIEL T. RODGERS, THE AGE OF FRACTURE 8–9 (2011). 
 13.  Elena Kagan, Presidential Authority, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245 (2001).  
 14.  Presidential Administration was cited 371 times in its first year alone.  Fred R. Shapiro 
& Michelle Pearse, The Most-Cited Law Review Articles of All Time, 110 MICH. L. REV. 1483, 
1495 (2012).  
 15.  Kagan, supra note 13. 
 16.  Id.
 17.  See id.
40701-hco_46-1 Sheet No. 105 Side B      10/23/2018   13:43:40
40701-hco_46-1 Sheet No. 105 Side B      10/23/2018   13:43:40
BOHM_MACROED FINAL 10.15.18 (DO NOT DELETE) 10/16/2018 9:19 AM 
194 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol.46:1 
discussion.  Specifically, the focus will be on the development of the 
presidential administration theory, a selection of prominent critiques to form 
observations of Kagan’s work, and the larger presidential control framework.  
Though legal theories are often portrayed as dispassionate and purely 
analytical, they are not insulated from broader external influences, and 
broader social trends may be influencing legal thought on an aspect of 
presidential power.18  Finally, the political backdrop during the emergence 
of presidential control theories in the Reagan era is contrasted with the more 
recent period; culminating with an argument rejecting “political 
accountability” as a justification for presidential directives in the face of 
political and institutional gridlock. 
I.  Constitutional Structure of the Administrative State 
Distrust of a powerful unified government is at the core of the American 
creation story.  Think back to stories from elementary school history and the 
heroic depictions of the American revolutionaries fighting back against a 
despotic English monarch.  James Madison wrote in the Federalist Paper 
that, “[i]f angels were to govern men, neither external nor internal controls 
on government would be necessary.”19  To allay fears of a strong national 
government the framers devised our tripartite structure designed to separate 
and distribute powers, creating incentives for each branch to “[keep] each 
other in their proper places.”20
Our government derives all authority from a Constitutional granted by 
the people.21  “We the People—remember the Preamble—have granted 
limited and enumerated powers to the three branches of the federal 
government.”22  The first three articles of the  Constitution outline the basic 
structure and power of the legislative, executive, and judicial branches. 
The text of the respective vesting clauses varies and, in keeping with 
the Constitution as a whole, are vague, but “[w]ill it be sufficient to mark, 
with precision, the boundaries of these [branches], in the constitution of the 
government, and to trust to these parchment barriers against the encroaching 
spirit of power?”23  The blending of powers necessary to form administrative 
agencies challenge the strict formalist adherence to the idea of separation of 
powers, and potentially breaks down the adversarial nature that was meant 
 18.  See RODGERS, supra note 12. 
 19.  THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (James Madison). 
 20.  Id.
 21.  Id.
 22.  MICHAEL STOKES PAULSEN, ET AL., THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 69 (3rd 
ed. 2016). 
 23.  THE FEDERALIST No. 48 (James Madison).  
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to keep governmental institutions in check.  Centralized power, and single-
minded governance seems to have been what the framers sought to prevent.  
James Madison warned, “[t]he accumulation of all powers, legislative, 
executive, and judiciary, in the same hands False . . may justly be 
pronounced the very definition of tyranny.”24
Given their revolutionary heritage, the framers were fearful of an 
overbearing central power and sought to create a government of divided 
powers to prevent the tyrannies of the recently displaced English Crown.25
Whether the existence of the modern administrative state should raise this 
same sort of concern is still up for debate.26  “Controlling and checking 
administrative agencies poses an important constitutional problem, 
unaddressed by the text or the framers’ intent.”27  We are left to ask: where 
exactly is decision making authority vested when Congress creates an 
executive agency, and to what extend may the President control his own 
people?28
II.  Administrative Law: Separation of Powers Operationalized 
Administrative agencies have existed since George Washington’s 
presidency.29  However, the modern administrative state looks dramatically 
different from the government as it existed in the founding era.  In 1802, 
there were 2,597 employees of executive agencies, by 1997 the number had 
grown to 1,872,000.30  According to the most recent report from 2017, the 
number stands at 2,087,747 federal employees working in executive 
agencies.31  As the administrative state has grown in size, scope, and 
complexity, the balance of power in the government has decidedly shifted 
 24.  ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 342 (5th ed. 2017), quoting THE
FEDERALIST No. 47 (James Madison). 
 25.  Richard R. Beeman, The Constitutional Convention of 1787: A Revolution in 
Government, NAT’L. CONSTITUTION CR., (last visited Apr. 15, 2018), https://constitutioncenter 
.org/interactive-constitution/white-pages/the-constitutional-convention-of-1787-a-revolution-in 
government. 
 26.  The modern administrative state has, to a large extent, evolved out of necessity as the 
government requires technical expertise and adequate staff to administer the law and programs 
Congress has created.  
 27.  CHEMERINSKY, supra note 24. 
 28.  See, e.g.,  supra note 10.  
 29.  Congress created the Department of Foreign Affairs, which would later be renamed the 
State Department in July 1789.  See Percival, supra note 7, at 973 n.49.  
 30.  Id. at 975 (citing Bruce Ackerman, The New Separation of Powers, 113 HARV. L. REV.
633, 691 (2000)). 
 31.  OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MGMT., SIZING UP THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH, FISCAL YEAR 2017 
(2018).
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towards the executive branch.32  However, this accumulation of power in a 
branch of government run by a single person may not be a desirable 
phenomenon. 
Agencies, being creatures of statute, are delegated their authority by 
Congress.33  The creation of an agency is a legislative exercise, while the 
actual operation is an executive function.34  Once created, the agency is 
handed to the President for him to administer.  This arrangement between 
Congress and the President creates issues of power sharing.  There is 
disagreement about whether the principle of separation of powers even 
allows for allocation of authority from one branch to another, and if so, what 
would be substantively required?35  However, it is interesting to note that this 
separation of powers question is a problem created by Congress itself.  
Precisely because administrative agencies are creatures of statute, Congress 
could resolve issues of presidential control if it would be more explicit about 
the design and structural intent of administrative agencies and how they are 
to operate.  As will be discussed later, Kagan herself states that she “accepts 
Congress’s broad power to insulate administrative activity from the 
president.”36  Congress need only weigh in on the matter.  However, that 
would necessitate taking a stance on an issue—something unlikely to 
happen. 
Taking the uncertainty of the Constitution as a given, there are a few 
tools that can be used to analyze constitutional issues.  With respect to 
separation of powers inquiries, the two main analytical flavors come in the 
form of formalist or functionalist inquiry.37  The formalist approach 
emphasizes the explicit power vested by the Constitution in the three 
branches of government.38  For formalists, the structure of the Constitution 
itself demands that power be kept separate.39  The question is if power “is 
exercised by the appropriate department in the appropriate way.”40  This 
offers a simple front-end check on administrative agency power by looking 
to the source of authority rather than a more uncertain inquiry into the action 
 32.  M. Elizabeth Magill, Beyond Powers and Branches in Separation of Powers Law, 150 U. 
PA. L. REV. 603, 604 (2001). 
 33.  Percival, supra note 7, at 967; CHEMERINSKY, supra note 24, at 355–56. 
 34.  Congress delegates functions of all three branches to agencies, but my focus will be on 
theories of the relationship between the President and administrative agencies with respect to the 
actual operation of the agency.   
 35.  Magill, supra note 32, at 607.  
 36.  Kagan, supra note 13, at 2251. 
 37.  Magill, supra note 32, at 608. 
 38.  Id.
 39.  Reflecting a strict textual and structural interpretation. 
 40.  Magill, supra note 32, at 609. 
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itself.  For example, Congress may enact laws and implement policy 
decisions via the legislative process, then hand them over to the President to 
execute.  However, Congress may not delegate its own legislative functions 
over to the executive branch.  Under a formalistic approach, delegations are 
permissible as long as they do not blur the boundaries between branches as 
created by the Constitution. 
A.  The Formalist Approach 
The influence of the formalist approach seemed to be at its height in the 
1930’s when the Supreme Court struck down two statutes on the grounds 
that they violated the nondelegation doctrine.41  “The nondelegation doctrine 
is rooted in the principle of separation of powers that underlies our tripartite 
government.”42  The only two cases where the Supreme Court struck down 
congressional delegations of power as impermissible are Panama Refining 
Co. v. Ryan, and A.L.A Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, both in 
1935.  The delegations in Panama Refining and Schechter Poultry were 
invalidated because the delegation purportedly granted the President 
legislative power without clear guidelines, or an adequate “intelligible 
principle.”43  Therefore, a presidential directive to an administrative agency 
absent a clear intelligible principle would not be permissible.  Almost two 
decades later, in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, Justice Black 
concluded that a presidential directive, absent clear congressional delegation 
of authority, violated the framers’ decision to “[entrust] the lawmaking 
power to the Congress alone in both good and bad times.”44  Justice Black’s 
statement is in keeping with later arguments that a President should not have 
unilateral authority in all realms, showing that concerns of executive 
overreach are nothing new. 
For formalists, the intelligible principle is a way for Congress to 
accomplish a constitutional transubstantiation of sorts, whereby the scope of 
executive delegation is limited even if not precisely defined by the express 
terms of the statute.45  “When the issue is delegation by Congress to the 
executive branch, the Supreme Court follows a standard it articulated in 
1928—that there must be an ‘intelligible principle’ in the legislation to guide 
 41.  The nondelegation doctrine is based on a textualist interpretation of the vesting clauses 
(the clauses say nothing about the ability to delegate power to other branches), as well as a strict 
structuralist interpretation of the three separate branches of government.  
 42.  Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 371 (1989) (upholding the delegation of power 
to promulgate federal sentencing guidelines to an independent Sentencing Commission). 
 43.  See Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935); A.L.A Schechter Poultry Corp. 
v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935). 
 44.  Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 587 (1952).  
 45.  See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 473–76 (2001). 
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the discretion of the government officials who are to implement the law.”46
The mere presence of an intelligible principle in the statutory delegation has 
the power to transform legislative power into executive power by sufficiently 
cabining the executive branch’s discretion. 
In an effort to maintain the separation of powers, the Court requires 
Congress to provide an intelligible principle to guide agency action with 
determinate criteria.47  While the Court invalidated the two challenges to 
statutes from the Panama Refining and Schechter Poultry cases discussed 
above, it has not invalidated a statute for lacking an adequate intelligible 
principle since.48  The “[nondelegation] doctrine has had one good year, and 
211 bad ones (and counting).”49
In modern jurisprudence, the Supreme Court has broadly 
accommodated congressional delegations to the administrative state as a 
practical necessity “of our increasingly complex society.”50  Though the 
nondelegation principle has largely gone by the wayside, the formal 
requirements of the intelligible principle live on in modern separation of 
powers jurisprudence; however, the structural constraint lacks the bite it once 
had.
B.  The Functionalist Approach 
On the other hand, the functionalist approach accepts that the branches 
of government will have overlapping powers and responsibilities.  Instead of 
the more formal textual and structural inquiry, the functional inquiry is if the 
overall balance between the branches has been upset by a particular 
delegation.51  This balancing test was articulated in Justice Jackson’s 
 46.  Stephen Wermiel, SCOTUS for law students: Non-delegation doctrine returns after long 
hiatus, SCOTUSblog (Dec. 4, 2014, 8:00 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2014/12/scotus-for-
law-students-non-delegation-doctrine-returns-after-long-hiatus/.
 47.  See Whitman, 531 U.S. at 457 (holding that the EPA’s mandate under the Clean Air Act 
to set levels “requisite to protect human health” was sufficient to cabin agency discretion).  
 48.  Though there have been attempts to revive the nondelegation doctrine over the years, the 
Supreme Court recently announced that it will hear another nondelegation challenge in the 
upcoming Gundy v. United States case (asking whether Congress improperly delegated authority 
to the Attorney General in the context determinations under the Sex Offender Notification and 
Registration Act); see Mark Joseph Stern, The Supreme Court May Revive a Legal Theory Last 
Used to Strike Down New Deal Laws, SLATE (Mar. 5, 2018, 12:26 PM), https://slate.com/news-
and-politics/2018/03/supreme-court-may-revive-non-delegation-doctrine-in-gundy-v-united-
states.html; Amy Howe, Justices grant review in two new cases, SCOTUSBLOG (Mar. 5, 2018, 
11:31 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2018/03/justices-grant-review-two-new-cases/. 
 49.  Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 315, 322 (2000). 
 50.  Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372 (1989).
 51.  See Magill, supra note 32. 
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concurrence in Youngstown where he acknowledged the inevitable blurring 
of powers: 
The actual art of governing under our Constitution does not and 
cannot conform to judicial definitions of the power of any of its 
branches based on isolated clauses or even single Articles torn 
from context.  While the Constitution diffuses power the better to 
secure liberty, it also contemplates that practice will integrate the 
dispersed powers into a workable government.52
Modern functionalists accept the delegation of legislative power to the 
executive as long as the delegation is somehow limited by statute.  Justices 
Stevens and Souter articulated this position in their concurring opinion in 
Whitman v. American Trucking Associations:
The Court has two choices.  We could choose to articulate our 
ultimate disposition of this issue by frankly acknowledging that 
the power delegated to the EPA is “legislative” but nevertheless 
conclude that the delegation is constitutional because adequately 
limited by the terms of the authorizing statute.  Alternatively, we 
could pretend, as the Court does, that the authority delegated to 
the EPA is somehow not “legislative power.”  Despite the fact that 
there is language in our opinions that supports the Court’s 
articulation of our holding, I am persuaded that it would be both 
wiser and more faithful to what we have actually done in 
delegation cases to admit that agency rulemaking authority is 
“legislative power.”53
For Justices Stevens and Souter “[a]s long as the delegation provides 
a sufficiently intelligible principle, there is nothing inherently 
unconstitutional about it.”54
Either through the flexible interpretation of the functionalists, or by the 
strict logic of the formalists, the Supreme Court permits Congress to delegate 
a considerable amount of discretion and authority to administrative agencies.  
However, given the President’s domination in the administrative arena, 
broad delegations to agencies have resulted in the accumulation of vast 
 52.  Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J. 
concurring).
 53.  Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 488 (2001) (Stevens, J., and Souter, J., 
concurring).
 54.  Id. at 490. 
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power in the executive branch.55  The modern separation of powers 
battleground has shifted from scrutinizing the delegation itself to the rights 
and responsibilities of the President.56
As the validity of delegations themselves has been largely accepted, the 
inquiry then shifts to that of identifying to whom statutory discretion is in 
fact delegated.  The text of the statutes themselves often vest authority in the 
administrator of the agency.57  Yet Unitary Executive Theorists58 would 
argue that the President is obligated to intervene with governance by such 
appointees as a matter of constitutional mandate.59  Under the Unitary view, 
the President may, and should, commandeer the operations of an agency.  
However, direct presidential decision making in the realm of the agency 
raises issues of statutory construction and separation of powers concerns.  
“[The] separation of powers reflects a conscious effort to diffuse authority 
to prevent abuses of power.”60“Inherent in this division of power is the notion 
that the President must respect statutory commands even when they require 
a result contrary to his own policy preferences.”61  The discussion that 
follows focuses on the President himself and his ability to direct and supplant 
agency decisions.  This raises legal questions of whether that directive power 
is permitted, and the separate normative question of whether centralized 
decision making is even desirable.  And even if unilateral presidential control 
is indeed desirable—a dubious contention—should the simplistic notion of 
“political accountability” be worthy of our faith as the bedrock of 
presidential checks and balances in the administrative arena?  Can it serve as 
a meaningful check on presidential whims to assuage concerns of arbitrary 
action?
 55.  See Magill, supra note 32. 
 56.  See, e.g., Lisa Schultz Bressman, Beyond Accountability: Arbitrariness and Legitimacy 
in the Administrative State, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 461, 469–85 (2003); Lisa S. Bressman & Michael 
P. Vandenbergh, Inside the Administrative State: A critical look at the practice of Presidential 
control, 105 MICH. L. REV. 47, 52–56 (2006); Blumstein, supra note 10; Kevin M. Stack, The 
President’s Statutory Powers to Administer the Laws, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 263 (2006).
 57.  The administrator of the agency (or board as may be the case with some agencies) is often 
explicitly named as the person to whom Congress has delegated discretion when implementing the 
law.   
 58.  Unitary Executive Theory suggests the answer to this question is a matter of constitutional 
interpretation.  If the President has been delegated “the Executive Power” by the Constitution, then 
he may—and is in fact obliged to—take charge of everything happening under his authority in the 
executive branch.  
 59.  See U.S. CONST. art. II, §§ 1, 3. 
 60.  Percival, supra note 7, at 969. 
 61.  Id.
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III.  Presidential Control of the Administrative State 
Elena Kagan’s Presidential Administration was the most widely cited 
law review article of 2001.62  At the time, Kagan’s theory was the latest 
iteration in a line of presidential control theories used to justify the 
administrative state.63 Presidential Administration is an important work to 
examine, given Kagan’s prominence in the legal field.  She is a legal 
academic, and was a law professor at both the University of Chicago School 
of Law and Harvard Law School.64  She served in the Clinton administration 
as Associate Counsel to the President, then Deputy Assistant to the President 
for Domestic Policy.65  Kagan then returned to academia to serve as Dean of 
Harvard Law School from 2003-2009 before returning to government when 
President Obama nominated her as Solicitor General in 2009.66  Most 
importantly, she took her seat on the United States Supreme Court as an 
Associate Justice in 2010.67  This is a person whose thoughts on 
constitutional issues matter a great deal.  As a high-profile legal figure, her 
opinions carry tremendous weight and are worthy of attention.  It is no 
wonder that her article is debated so frequently. 
Many articles that discuss Presidential Administration recognize it as a 
significant contribution to the development of the presidential control model.68
However, the vast majority of academic papers that cite to Presidential 
Administration merely reference it in passing with a single footnote.69  Given 
a sample of 105 journal articles which cite to Presidential Administration, only 
15% address Kagan’s proposed theory with much detail.70  Yet even those 
 62.  Shapiro & Pearse, supra note 14, at 1495 (Presidential Administration with an estimated 
371 citations in the first year after publication). 
 63.  See Bressman, supra note 56 (Professor Bressman provides an overview of the 
development of Presidential control models in Section I.  Past models include: transmission belt, 
expertise, and interest group representation models.). 
 64.  Current Members of the United States Supreme Court, SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED 
STATES (last visited Mar. 17, 2017, 12:23 PM), https://www.supremecourt.gov/about/biograph 
ies.aspx.
 65.  Id.
 66.  Id.
 67.  Id.
 68.  Whether the authors agree or not with Kagan’s particular take on presidential control, 
Presidential Authority is often regarded as a significant addition to the presidential control field. 
 69.  In a sample of 105 articles that reference Kagan’s Presidential Administration (PA), 38 
mentioned PA once, 36 mentioned PA two to five times, with only 16 mentioning PA in more than 
ten footnotes.  Articles were found using Westlaw.  To keep the search manageable for this short 
project, the search was focused on journals published by law schools ranked in the top 14 by U.S. 
News & World Report, and student notes were removed.   
 70.  Id., with “much detail” meaning that the article cited to Presidential Authority 10 or more 
times.  
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scholars tend to discuss presidential control theories in general rather than 
the specific merits of Kagan’s propositions.71  In articles where the 
discussion does center on the theory of presidential authority, the focus 
seems to be on the implausibility of Kagan’s political accountability 
argument.72  Meanwhile, Kagan’s more specific contribution of a statutory 
interpretation justification does not seem to have gained much traction.73
Overall, her justifications seem to be challenged rather than embraced.74
IV.  Traditional Presidential Control 
Kagan embraces a strong view of presidential control over the executive 
branch.75  This view is articulated in Presidential Authority, where she 
describes a middle ground between the “traditional” view and the “unitary 
executive theory.”76
According to the traditional view, Congress has the constitutional 
authority to directly vest discretionary authority in the head of an agency.77
Following the traditional separation of powers approach and the current 
method of statutory interpretation, the delegation to an agency head is 
understood to preclude presidential directives:78
Basic separation of powers doctrine maintains that Congress must 
authorize presidential exercises of essentially lawmaking 
functions.  In directing agency officials as to the use of their 
delegated discretion, the President engages in such functions, but 
without the requisite congressional authority. Congress indeed has 
 71.  Referring to the sample of articles mentioned supra note 69. 
 72.  See, e.g., Kagan, supra note 13. 
 73.  See Percival, supra note 7 (arguing that Kagan’s statutory interpretation framework is 
inconsistent with constitutional text, as well as congressional intent regarding administrative 
agency structure); Blumstein, supra note 10 (dismissing structural arguments as being policy 
arguments in camouflage); Bressman, supra, note 56 (political accountability is an insufficient 
rationale for justifying presidential directive authority); Neal K. Katyal, Internal Separation of 
Powers: Checking Today’s Most Dangerous Branch From Within, 115 YALE L.J. 2314 (2006) 
(Presidential agendas are too short-term oriented to provide sufficient incentives to justify political 
accountability rationale for reaching the best long term interests—efficiency is not the same as 
wisdom).
 74.  Of the articles in my sample, only one supported Kagan’s political accountability 
argument; see Blumstein, supra note 10.   
 75.  See Kagan, supra note 13. 
76.  Id.
 77.  Todd B. Tatelman, Supreme Court Nominee Elena Kagan: Presidential Authority and the 
Separation of Powers, U.S. CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE 7 (Report No. R41272, June 4, 
2010).
 78.  Kagan, supra note 13, at 2319–20. 
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delegated discretionary power, but only to specified executive 
branch officials; by assuming responsibility for this power, the 
president thus exceeds the appropriate bounds of his office.79
Expressed another way, because “Congress has, by statute, specifically 
vested the decision making authority in the agency head, the President cannot 
‘go so far as to displace the agency head’s discretion to make decisions 
vested in that officer by law.’”80  For traditionalists, the statutory delegations 
seem to stand on the plain meaning of the text and precludes presidential 
interference. 
In contrast, unitary executive theorists assert that the Constitution vests 
exclusive control of the executive branch in the hands of the President.81
Any attempt by Congress to limit the President’s control over the executive 
branch is unconstitutional—particularly with respect to the creation of 
independent agencies.  In addition to a strict reading of the Constitution, 
unitarians invoke a political accountability argument to further justify 
unitary executive control by the President, as he is ultimately held 
responsible for the collective action of the government.82  However, Kagan 
explicitly rejects such a strong stance, and states that “the unitarians have 
failed to establish their claim for plenary control as a matter of constitutional 
mandate.”83  “The original meaning of Article II is insufficiently precise and, 
in this area of staggering change, also insufficiently relevant to support the 
unitarian position.”84
V.  Kagan’s Presidential Administration 
As control of the administrative state has become more centralized over 
time, various models of presidential control have emerged as an attempt to 
justify this framework as consistent with the Constitution’s structural 
separation of powers.85  It seems that Kagan uses the term “presidential 
administration” to describe a middle ground between the traditional view 
that is dominant in modern administrative law, and the minority Unitary 
Executive understanding of presidential power.  Her theory is primarily 
based on observations of President Clinton’s practice while in office and his 
 79.  Kagan, supra note 13, at 2319–20. 
 80.  Tatelman, supra note 77.
 81.  Id., at 8; U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3 (the “take care” clause).   
 82.  Id. at 9 (citing Steven G. Calabresi & Christopher S. Yoo, Remove Morrison v. Olson, 62 
VAND. L. REV. 103, 116 (2009)).  
 83.  Kagan, supra note 13, at 2326. 
 84.  Id.
 85.  Bressman & Vandenbergh, supra note 56, at 52–56.  
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innovations on preexisting presidential control techniques.86  Those 
innovations include re-tooling review by the Office of Information and 
Regulatory Affairs (OIRA)—shifting from Reagan’s deregulatory agenda, 
issuing directives, and publicly taking credit/responsibility for certain 
agency action.87
Before sketching the framework of presidential administration, Kagan 
gives a review of “non-presidential” mechanisms of administrative control, 
which includes: congressional control of delegations, self-control (similar to 
agency expertise justifications), interest group control, and judicial control.88
Since the tools underlying presidential administration did not originate in the 
Clinton Administration, Kagan also reviewed the origins of  centralized 
executive review of agency rulemaking by OIRA, which was established by 
President Reagan.89  President Ronald Reagan’s innovative use of 
presidential power transformed the chief executive’s relationship with the 
administrative state, setting the tone for his successors in office.90  “From 
controversial fringe to mainstream in twenty years, centralized presidential 
regulatory review has now taken center stage as an institutionalized part of 
the modern American presidency.”91
However, Kagan’s theory presented in Presidential Administration is 
based on President Clinton’s unique brand of presidential control.  Kagan 
recognizes that President Clinton built on President Reagan’s novel 
regulatory review process92 by expanding presidential authority over 
administrative agencies, and in some circumstances even claiming the power 
to direct outcomes.93  But, one of the key features that distinguished 
Clinton’s practice of presidential control was his “articulation and use of 
directive authority over regulatory agencies.”94  Kagan defined “directive 
authority” as the President’s “commands to executive branch officials to take 
specified actions within their statutorily delegated discretion.”95  The second 
 86.  Kagan, supra note 13.  
 87.  Id. at 2290–303.  
 88.  Id. at 2253–69.  The development and demise of the expertise and interest group control 
models are discussed by Professor Bressman in her article; see Bressman, supra note 56, at 469–
78.
 89.  Id. at 2277–81.  
 90.  Blumstein, supra note 10, at 853. 
 91.  Id. at 854–55. 
 92.  See Exec. Order No. 12291, 46 Fed. Reg. 13193 (Feb. 17, 1981). 
 93.  See Kagan, supra note 13, at 2281–2319; Exec. Order No. 12866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51735 
(Sept. 30, 1993), (giving the president the power to resolve disputed between an agency and OIRA, 
“[t]o the extent permitted by law”). 
 94.  Kagan, supra note 13, at 2250. 
 95.  Id.
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component of this new form of presidential control was Clinton’s “assertion 
of personal ownership over regulatory product.”96  This presidential 
ownership of agency action was achieved by personal announcement and 
appropriation of regulatory decisions and actions at public appearances by 
the President to “promote himself and his policies.”97  Importantly, these 
enhancements on the more traditional behind-the-scenes approach to 
regulatory oversight are what give presidential administrations a claim to 
greater transparency.  “[President Clinton thus] emerged in public, and to the 
public, as the wielder of “executive authority” and, in that capacity, the 
source of regulatory action.”98  This more transparent aspect of presidential 
administration, as compared to prior theories of presidential control, lays the 
“political accountability” underpinnings for Kagan’s take on statutory 
interpretation.  However, as seen below, this argument is lacking in regard 
to persuasive power because it is an oversimplification of the process, and 
glosses over the fact that the President can simply hide or distance himself 
from less popular actions. 
VI.  Statutory Interpretation 
Kagan’s proposed shift from the traditional separation of powers 
viewpoint to the one proposed in Presidential Administration hinges on 
changing how Congressional delegations to administrative agencies are 
interpreted.99  Under the traditional view of separation of powers, the specific 
delegation of decision making authority to an agency head precludes 
presidential intervention, unless explicitly provided for.100  Whereas, 
Unitarians argue that the President has inherent authority over the 
administrative officials that stem directly from the constitutional grant of 
executive authority.  Although, unlike Unitarians, Kagan accepts 
congressional primacy in the delegation arena.101  However, she argues that 
recognizing congressional control does not necessarily mean that the 
President lacks directive power: 
[M]y acceptance of congressional authority in this area does not 
require the conclusion, assumed on the conventional view, that the 
President lacks all power to direct administrative officials as to the 
 96.  Kagan, supra note 13, at 2250.
 97.  Id. at 2299–300.   
 98.  Id. at 2300.  
 99.  Kagan, supra note 13, at 2320.  
 100.  Id.
 101.  Id. at 2326. 
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exercise of their delegated discretion. That Congress could bar the 
President from directing discretionary action does not mean that 
Congress has done so; whether it has is a matter of statutory 
construction.102
Kagan’s legal innovation is the creation of a middle ground between the 
Traditional and Unitary views with her shift in statutory interpretation.103
Kagan “acknowledge[s] that Congress generally may grant discretion to 
agency officials alone and that when Congress has done so, the President 
must respect the limits of this delegation.”104  But as she points out, 
congressional limitations precluding presidential influence are focused on 
insulating independent agencies.105  In general, Kagan argues, the limitation 
of delegated discretion should not apply to “regular” executive agencies.  
The “statutory predicate” underlying the traditional separation of powers 
view is but one of two constitutionally permissible interpretive methods.106
She suggests “that most statutes granting discretion to [the] executive 
branch—but not independent—agency officials should be read as leaving 
ultimate decision making authority in the hands of the President.”107  That is, 
unless specifically excluded, the President should not be read out of 
delegations of power. 
Kagan addresses the constitutional concerns raised by her theory by 
invoking key Supreme Court decisions that have commented on the scope of 
presidential control, such as Youngstown and the removal line of cases (e.g., 
Myers, Humphrey’s Executor, and Morrison).108  After distinguishing the 
key cases and addressing legal hurdles, Kagan concludes that it is 
permissible to “assume that the delegation runs to the agency official 
specified, rather than to any other agency official, but still subject to the 
ultimate control of the President.”109  When attempting to decipher 
congressional intent, Kagan argues, it is permissible—and in her perspective, 
desirable—to assume that “Congress knows . . . that executive officials stand 
 102.  Kagan, supra note 13, at 2326. 
 103.  See id.
 104.  Id. at 2320. 
 105.  Id.
 106.  Kagan, supra note 13, at 2320
 107.  Id.
 108.  Id. at 2320–37; see also Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926), Humphrey’s 
Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 603 (1935), and Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988). 
 109. Kagan, supra note 13, at 2326–27. 
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in all other respects in a subordinate position to the President.”110  This 
understanding is what led congress to impose statutory restrictions on 
presidential involvement with independent agencies.111  However, statutes 
should not be read to restrict presidential involvement in executive branch 
agencies, unless explicitly stated.  Her conclusion, that Congress may not 
place removal restrictions on all administrative officers, is based on the 
President’s right to procedural oversight and directive authority.112  “[W]hen 
Congress delegates to an executive official, it in some necessary and obvious 
sense also delegates to the President.”113
If taking the perspective that the branches are in competition, it may be 
expected that Congress would guard its constitutional power to legislate and 
make policy decisions.114  After all, executive agencies have no authority 
other than that given to them by Congress.  Ideally, this separation of powers 
acts as a check on the administrative state.  “To the extent that Congress 
delegates specifically and clearly to administrative agencies, it performs this 
control function effectively.”115  However, Congress has given away vast 
amounts of policy making authority to administrative agencies through open-
ended delegations.116  Congress has made the decision—whether made of 
concern for efficiency, the desire for agency expertise, or perhaps to avoid 
the political liability of decision making—to delegate broad powers to the 
executive branch.117
Kagan argues that the assumption that Congress intended to retain 
control of agencies, or insulate them from the President, “does not square 
with many other aspects of Congress’s behavior.”118  Furthermore, the 
existence of removal restrictions in independent agencies shows that 
Congress knows how to prevent presidential interference when it wants to.  
The fact that Congress did not restrict presidential influence on other 
agencies can just as validly be assumed to infer acceptance of the practice.119
 110.  Kagan, supra note 13, at 2327 (this conclusion is related to Kagan’s discussion of the 
removal line of cases which have established the President’s authority to remove certain officers 
without cause).  
 111.  Id. at 2325–26 (the limitations of Presidential influence come from congress’ ability to 
place removal restrictions).  
 112.  Id. (emphasis added)
 113.  Id. at 2328. 
 114.  Kagan, supra note 13, at 2255. 
 115.  Id.
 116.  Id.
 117.  See id. at 2254–61. 
 118.  Id. at 2330. 
 119.  Id. at 2327. 
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“Congress knows, after all, that executive officials stand in all other respects 
in a subordinate position to the President.”120
. . .Congress has reposed considerable, and ever-increasing, 
authority in the [executive branch].  So too if the assumption [of 
competition for power between the branches] were true, recent 
assertions of presidential authority over all agencies, executive 
and independent, would have met stiffer resistance from Congress 
than they in fact encountered.  For reasons earlier discussed, 
Congress tends to defend its institutional interests poorly.  There 
seems little reason to presume that as to the single matter of 
directive authority, Congress self-consciously has adopted such an 
uncommonly self-protective posture.121
Alternatively, Kagan recognizes that it is equally, if not more, likely 
“that Congress generally has no intent on the matter” of presidential directive 
authority.122
As stated previously, Congressional delegation of authority is a 
choice—and perhaps this confusion and constitutional handwringing is in 
large part the fault of Congress and its inability to express its intent clearly, 
if at all.  As Kagan suggests, absent a clear delegation to only the agency 
head or restriction, a role for the President should not be read out of the 
statutory delegation.123  Kagan also argues that the method of statutory 
interpretation is also a choice.124  She ultimately suggests that a default 
interpretive principle that leaves space for  presidential control is not only 
consistent with statutory delegation, but may more accurately reflect the 
intent and understanding of Congress.125  Referencing the structure of the 
administrative state itself, Kagan argues that if Congress intended to retain 
greater control over policymaking, and preclude presidential interference, 
independent agencies would be more common than executive agencies; 
which is not the case.126  However, this discounts the fact that it is difficult 
to divine congressional intent from what it has not done, and might be the 
result of an overly simplistic reduction of the political process.  Can the 
 120.  Kagan, supra note 13, at 2327. 
 121.  Id. at 2330. 
 122.  Id.
 123.   Kagan, supra note 13, at 2328. 
 124.  Id.
 125.  Id. at 2330. 
 126.  Id.
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inaction, or political inability/unwillingness of Congress to act, really be 
interpreted as a positive desire to hand such power to a rival branch? 
VII.  Political Accountability 
For Kagan, two core issues are central to presidential control models; 
(1) making the administration accountable to the public, and (2) making the 
administration efficient or otherwise effective.127  These two goals are often 
viewed to be in conflict with each other because increased efficiency is often 
associated with increased delegation to unelected agency officials.128  Kagan 
makes the case that presidential administration resolves this conflict by 
consolidating ultimate agency leadership and decision making authority in a 
single politically accountable agent—i.e., the President—enhancing both 
transparency and efficiency.129
Kagan argues that enhancing the President’s role increases political 
accountability, because it “establishes an electoral link between the public 
and the bureaucracy,” where no such direct link existed before.130  This link 
is desirable “because the President has a national constituency, [and] he is 
likely to consider . . . the preferences of the general public, rather than 
merely parochial interests.”131  “The Presidency’s unitary power structure, 
its visibility, and its ‘personality’ all render the office peculiarly apt to 
exercise power in ways that the public can identify and evaluate.”132  If 
nothing else, this assumption of accountability to a broad national 
constituency is consistent with the President’s selfish incentives for his 
reelection and favorable legacy.133
“Because the public holds Presidents, and often Presidents alone, 
responsible for so many aspects of governmental performance, Presidents 
have a large stake in ensuring an administration that works, at least in the 
eyes of the public.”134  Therefore, given a President who is responsive and 
politically accountable to the electorate, his direct control of the 
administrative state will not only enhance its functioning, but is in fact 
 127.  Kagan, supra note 13, at 2331. 
 128.  Id.
 129.  Id.
 130.  Id. at 2332. 
 131.  Id. at 2335.   
 132.  Kagan, supra note 13, at 2332. 
 133.  Id. (“The advent of what has become known as the permanent Presidential campaign, a 
development linked to fundamental changes in polling technology and mass media, at once 
demonstrates and reinforces the President’s attention to the national electorate’s views and 
interests.”). 
 134.  Id. at 2339.  
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democratically desirable.135  From an institutional choice perspective, “the 
President holds the comparative advantage” with respect to the oversight of 
the administrative state compared to Congress.136
Kagan’s central argument is that it is permissible, and likely desirable, 
to shift the default method of statutory interpretation because the President 
is a politically accountable elected official.137  Her reframing of the statutory 
interpretive lens does the “legal work” in Presidential Administration, while 
“political accountability” provides the normative footing. 
It is her reliance on the unique position of the presidency in relation to 
the administrative state and the claimed benefits of political accountability 
that provide the policy rationales used to defend her theory of presidential 
control.138  Kagan shifted the conversation away from constitutional analysis 
and statutory interpretation to a normative discussion of political 
accountability—the critiques followed suit.  The result seems to be that 
Kagan’s statutory shift has gotten lost in the ether as the majority of 
responses focus on the normative political accountability rationale. 
VIII.  The Response 
At first blush, the academic response to Kagan’s Presidential
Administration looks extensive.  An initial database search yielded 905 
different sources that have cited Presidential Authority.139  There is no doubt 
that her work is influential, but the substance of presidential authority is not 
as widely debated as that initial number might suggest. 
For the purposes of this note, attention was focused on a subset of 
prominent articles written by the most influential academics in the 
administrative law field.  As a proxy for “prominent academic,” the sample 
was limited to articles published by journals associated with law schools in 
the top 16 of the U.S. News & World Reports.140  Articles with titles “clearly 
unrelated” to presidential control, administrative agencies, statutory 
 135.  Kagan, supra note 13, at 2335–37.  
 136.  See id. at 2336–37. 
 137.  Id.
138.  See id. at 2346–80 (Kagan uses the concept of political accountability to deflect concerns 
of decreased congressional oversight (at 2347), the pushing out of agency experts (at 2352), the 
displacement of constituency input (at 2358), non-delegation challenges (at 2364), and traditional 
reliance on judicial review (at 2372)).   
 139.  Sources include all documents that cite Kagan’s Presidential Authority from 2001–18 as 
listed in the WestLaw, Lexis, and JSTOR databases.  The sources were distributed as follows: 
Cases, 11; Briefs, 25; Administrative Decisions, 6; Journal Articles, 841; “Other Legal”, 12; “Law 
Adjacent” (Political Science articles), 10.  
 140.  Student notes were also eliminated.  
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interpretation, or separation of powers were removed (e.g., statute or case-
specific notes).141
Of the 105 articles in my subset between 2001 and 2018, Presidential
Authority was cited an average of 5.3 times, with 71% of articles citing it 
five times or fewer; 37%, merely included a single passing reference.  This 
suggests that many articles were citing the article in recognition of its 
popularity but did not in fact discuss Kagan’s propositions.  To further 
narrow the focus of review, the number of citations to Presidential 
Administration, were used as a proxy for an article’s depth of analysis of 
Kagan’s arguments.  Removing articles with fewer than ten references left a 
sample set of 16 articles for more in-depth review.142
Of the 16 articles reviewed, only one supported Kagan’s ultimate 
conclusions for direct presidential control. However, the author did not adopt 
Kagan’s statutory interpretation argument.143  The author instead, argued 
from the Unitarian perspective, stating that “on the issue of centralized 
presidential regulatory review—about its desirability, its legality, and the 
methods of its implementation—it appears that we are all (or nearly all) 
Unitarians now.”144
The main critiques of Presidential Administration come in three 
categories which argue on: statutory interpretation grounds alone, a mix of 
statutory and political accountability arguments, or by highlighting the faults 
of the political accountability justification. 
XI.  Statutory Interpretation Critiques 
An example of the formalist-type critique of Presidential 
Administration can be seen in Professor Strauss’s article Overseer, or “The 
Decider”? The President in Administrative Law.145  In his article, Strauss 
shows that the President’s constitutional role in the administrative state is 
limited to that of overseer, unless Congress specifically outlines a decision 
making role.146  His arguments are structural and textual in nature.  He 
explains how the Constitution delegates authority over the administrative 
state to Congress—highlighting this Congressional preference by noting 
 141.  “Clearly unrelated” often included language indicating a very narrow topic, usually 
discussions of a specific case or statute.  
 142.  This process likely eliminated some excellent articles that are on point but, given the 
nature of a student note, the criteria seemed to be an appropriate way to sufficiently limit the scope 
of review.  
 143.  See Blumstein, supra note 10, at 851. 
 144.  Id. at 852. 
 145.  See Strauss 2007, supra note 10. 
 146.  Id. at 705. 
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“other than the President and Vice President, no executive branch office 
exists without legislation.”147  Professor Strauss’ views are consistent over 
time.  A quote from a 1997 article of his shows the same interpretive stance.  
“Yet, as seen, the text of the Constitution settles no more than the President 
is to be the overseer of executive government, and False . . . the contours and 
extent of present-day government make a stronger reading unacceptably 
hazardous to public health.”148
IX.  Mixed Critiques 
Examples of a “mixed critique” on both statutory and political 
accountability grounds, include articles by professors Einer Elhauge and 
Robert Percival.  Professor Elhauge’s argument relies on court precedent and 
judicial review of administrative actions.149  Kagan’s arguments for 
enhanced presidential control and political accountability are most salient 
during times of political gridlock—where presidential directives 
dramatically increase government efficiency.  However, Elhauge argues 
against granting the President broad directive power, even in the gridlock 
scenario.150  After all, the purpose of administrative law seems to be to ensure 
predictability and confidence in the procedural aspects of decision making.  
For Elhauge, the answer to the dilemma already exists within the Chevron
framework, specifically the “extraordinary case” exception.151  Elhauge 
argues against Kagan’s political accountability justification and instead 
promotes an “enactable political preferences” standard to be used by courts 
in limited circumstances to maximize political satisfaction.152  This 
essentially creates a sort of political reasonableness standard for the court.153
Elhauge further shows that the Supreme Court has specifically declined 
to adopt the President’s political accountability as a justification for giving 
deference with respect to agency action.154  Though not in the exact context 
of Kagan’s use of political accountability, Elhauge seems to use the Court’s 
rejection as weight for his institutional choice argument that courts are 
 147.  Strauss 2007, supra note 10, at 722.  
 148.  Peter L. Strauss, Presidential Rulemaking, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 965, 985 (1997) 
(emphasis in original). 
 149.  See Einer Elhauge, Preference-Estimating Statutory Default Rules, 102 COLUM. L. REV.
2027 (2002).  
 150.  Id. at 2153. 
 151.  Id.
 152.  Id. at 2152–56. 
 153.  See id. at 2155–58. 
 154.  Id. at 2152–53 
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already well suited to handle administrative issues, even in times of political 
gridlock.
On the other hand, Professor Percival addresses Kagan’s specific 
arguments head on in Presidential Management of the Administrative State: 
The Not-So-Unitary Executive.155  Percival takes a strong textualist view of 
separation of powers, rejecting the President’s role in administrative decision 
making.156  For Percival, the Constitution may grant the President the power 
to appoint certain officials, but he rejects the contention that the removal line 
of cases have any implication on the President’s ability to interfere with 
agency decision making.157  The power to fire is not the power to substitute 
discretion.  Percival further builds his argument by stating that “the executive 
departments are creatures, not of the Constitution directly, but of 
Congressional statutes.”158  When Congress exercises its legislative authority 
to create administrative agencies pursuant to the Necessary and Proper 
Clause, it “suggests that the Framers envisioned that certain powers could be 
vested directly in executive departments or officers.”159  At most, Percival 
concedes that the President has “some supervisory authority over the heads 
of executive agencies,” but is not vested with the power to direct agency 
decisions.160
Percival also disagrees with the political accountability justification for 
dictating agency decisions.161  In contrast to Kagan’s assertion that the 
President is a transparent public figure, Percival argues that giving him 
directive authority would likely obfuscate presidential interference, not 
enhance process transparency.162  “[B]y allowing the President to 
countermand agency decisions, accountability would be blurred because in 
many cases the public would be unable to understand whether a decision was 
the product of the agency’s expertise or a presidential directive.”163  Instead, 
Percival argues that the President’s role is, and should be, limited to that of 
an advisor as he “has no authority to dictate regulatory decisions entrusted 
to [agencies] by law.”164
 155.  See Percival, supra note 7. 
 156.  Id. at 967–69. 
 157.  Id.
 158.  Id. at 967. 
 159.  Id. at 968. 
 160.  Percival, supra note 7, at 968–69. 
 161.  See id. at 1008–10. 
 162.  Id. at 1009. 
 163.  Id.
 164.  Id. at 1011. 
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X.  Political Accountability Critiques 
Professors Lisa Schultz Bressman and Neal Katyal advance critiques 
centered on the political accountability justification of presidential control.  
Professor Bressman takes aim at political accountability in her introductory 
line: “[t]his Article argues that efforts to square the administrative state with 
the constitutional structure have become too fixated on the concern for 
political accountability.”165  For Bressman, it is a mistake to focus on 
accountability. Instead, she argues that the primary concern of administrative 
law, and our entire constitutional system of checks and balance for that 
matter, is aimed at preventing arbitrariness.166  Bressman turns Kagan’s 
argument on its head by asserting that the constitutional goal of the 
administrative state is not accountability but the minimization of arbitrary 
administrative action—often achieved by preventing the President from 
asserting control.167
Also, as a threshold matter, Bressman notes that the base assumptions 
for presidential control models are overly simplistic.  For her, the reality of 
the executive branch is not captured by the various models: “. . . [S]cholars 
may have underestimated the complexity of White House involvement.  
Presidential control is a ‘they,’ not an ‘it.’”168  In addition to Bressman’s 
ordering of constitutional priorities, she argues that Kagan’s theory cannot 
work because “transparency alone is not enough to combat arbitrary 
administrative decision making.”169  The validity of Kagan’s political 
accountability justification rests on the assumption that the presidency’s 
operations are transparent.170  However, as with Percival above, Bressman 
argues that “the President has the incentive and ability to hide control.”171
Essentially, this selective transparency cannot satisfy the baseline 
assumptions of Kagan’s theory, and therefore political accountability is an 
insufficient justification for presidential control.  However, even if Bressman 
thought Kagan’s assumptions were accurate, the theory would still not 
legitimize the administrative state in her eyes unless it protected against 
arbitrary action.172  It is doubtful that a model which allows a single actor—
even one politically accountable to a national constituency—to unilaterally 
 165.  Bressman, supra note 56, at 461. 
166.  Id. at 468. 
 167.  Id. at 523–27. 
 168.  Bressman & Vandenbergh, supra note 56, at 49.   
 169.  Bressman, supra note 56, at 503.  
 170.  Clinton’s transparency and political ownership was a key point in Kagan’s theoretical 
development.
 171.  Bressman, supra note 56, at 506.  
 172.  Id. at 514. 
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direct policy decisions would offer the procedural protections against 
arbitrary decision making that Professor Bressman seeks. 
Finally, Professor Katyal addresses the historical context in which 
Kagan developed her theory as part of his critique.  “Kagan was self-
consciously writing in an era of divided government . . . ,” and Katyal 
questions whether the objectivity of someone writing from the “vantage-
point of an administration that wants to get things done is the proper one for 
setting parameters in constitutional and administrative law.”173
Katyal also critiques a flaw in the political accountability justification, 
namely that the President’s incentives do not necessarily align with the 
national interest, but instead are short-term in nature and tend to seek instant 
gratification.174  He argues that centralized power with the aim of increasing 
efficiency may not be a good thing.  “[T]here are values other than 
efficiency, values celebrated by our Founders.  Indeed, a starting point for 
our government is the evil of government efficiency.”175  Professor Katyal 
closes his section on Presidential Administration with a punchy quip.  “In 
the end, Kagan is surely right to point out that a President has a ‘stake’ in 
building an efficient government, but efficiency is not the equivalent of 
wisdom.”176
XI.  The Oversimplification of Political Accountability 
One side will always be happy if given unilateral control.  It is easy to 
argue for greater efficiency and authority when your preferred political party 
is in power.  As Professor Katyal said, Kagan was writing from the “vantage-
point of an administration that wants to get things doneFalse”177  However, 
the trick is to think about how much power you would be willing to give your 
political adversaries when you are in the minority.
“When people are fearful, angry or confused . . . they are tempted to 
give away freedoms to leaders promising order.”178  Political hyperbole is 
ever present, however the substantive relationship of the President and the 
administrative state, and the interplay of transparency, accountability, legal 
interpretation, and politics should be the focus.  And as with any political 
debate, the same facts can yield very different results.  The diversity of 
perspectives seen in the discussion above are likely due to the politics of the 
 173.  Katyal, supra note 73, at 2343–44. 
 174.  See id. at 2345. 
 175.  Id. at 2344. 
 176.  Katyal, supra note 73, at 2345. 
 177.  Id. at 2343–44. 
 178.  The Economist (@TheEconomist), TWITTER (Apr. 14, 2018, 3:34 PM), https://twitter. 
com/TheEconomist/status/985287503899918338. 
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particular academic and the policy goals they may wish to advance in their 
work.
However, these critiques were not formed in an academic vacuum.  
Aside from theoretical and doctrinal distinctions discussed by the authors, 
there is an additional background layer that may offer some insight into the 
various perspectives on presidential control.  Theories of presidential control 
evolve in imperfect ways.  They are the result of a “make it work moment,” 
incorporating various values and concepts in search of reaching legitimacy 
in order to achieve “a critical mass of public acceptance for the 
administrative state.”179
Professor Adrian Vermeule explains that “each theorist ends up 
adopting a kind of roughly optimizing pluralism of values for the 
administrative state—a pluralism in which expertise, political accountability, 
and legalism all have some claims . . . in a way that aims to generate a critical 
mass of public acceptance.”180  For Vermeule, the legitimacy of the 
administrative state is a foregone conclusion; criticism, even those claiming 
illegitimacy, have the effect of reinforcing and strengthening the its integrity: 
It is a conceptual mistake to think that complaints about the 
administrative state, even on constitutional grounds, are 
necessarily sociological evidence of the illegitimacy of the 
regime.  Such arguments may also be conventional moves within
the regime, which vent steam and thereby actually have a 
legitimating effect.  If they result in more or less minor 
adjustments of legal and institutional rules—a bit more Office of 
Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) oversight here, a bit 
less judicial deference there, and so on—that is a sign of the 
fundamental health, adaptability, and social legitimacy of the 
regime, not of crisis.181
Vermeule’s articulation that theoretical models adapt in search of 
achieving public acceptance plays well with a brief commentary situating the 
historical and social backgrounds of the development of Presidential 
Authority.  This commentary hopes to provide an explanation for the 
surprising resistance Presidential Authority seems to have encountered. 
In his book, Age of Fracture, Professor Daniel T. Rodgers, and 
intellectual historian, characterized the last quarter century as the “age of 
 179.  Adrian Vermeule, Bureaucracy and Distrust: Landis, Jaffee, and Kagan on the 
Administrative State, 130 HARV. L. REV. 2463, 2465 (2017).  
 180.  Id.
 181.  Id.
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fracture.”182  During the age of fracture, no other figure loomed larger than 
President Ronald Reagan.183  This certainly rings true in the presidential 
control realm.  Rodgers’s observations that the obsession with the free 
market and the search for efficiency permeated society at large, along with a 
range of disciplines—including the law.184  Notably, Rodgers showed how 
the obsession with efficiency and the language of economics crept into the 
everyday language and politics of the age.185
President Reagan was a successful advocate of modern presidential 
control practices, and Rodgers’’ age of fracture coincides with the Reagan 
era’s presidential administrative controls and deregulation.  The rise of 
presidential control was based on the promise of optimizing government 
administration and promoting general efficiency—in line with the economic 
zeitgeist of the Reagan era.  Presidential control as practiced by Reagan 
focused on confidential involvement behind the scenes, through OIRA, to 
slow down the rulemaking process.186  Such concealment is antithetical to 
Kagan’s modern transparency and political accountability justifications. 
That, however, eventually morphed into the practice of presidential 
administration under Clinton, with the President highlighting his role and 
agenda, and issuing executive orders that explicitly claim the authority to 
direct agency officers.187
By translating Kagan’s justifications for presidential administration into 
the economic language dominant in the Reagan era: “transparency” and 
“political responsiveness of the President” easily become recognizable as 
“perfect information” and “market response” in the economic lexicon.  
Professor Bressman’s heightened concern of “arbitrary action” tracks well 
with “risk aversion” and economic anxiety.  The language and practice of 
presidential control models track well with the broader discourse of the 
Reagan era, helping the consolidation of presidential power gain traction. 
But, what about the relatively recent pushback against the justifications 
used to legitimize presidential control, specifically with respect to the 
discussion of Presidential Administration after 2001?  Was there a 
substantial break separating Rodgers’ “age of fracture” the Reagan era and 
our new era of contested presidential power?  The fact that only a single 
article in the sample supported Kagan’s enhanced version of presidential 
control may indicate a lack of complacency with centralized control.  This 
 182.  RODGERS, supra note 12.   
 183.  Id.
 184.  See RODGERS, supra note 12, at 80–81. 
 185.  Id.
 186.  See Kagan, supra note 13, at 2333. 
 187.  Id. at 2285–90. 
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could indicate that concern for efficiency has been overtaken by concerns for 
arbitrary decisions.  Perhaps Americans have become more skeptical of the 
market dogma of absolute efficiency prominent in the Regan era in a period 
marked by high inequality and the worst economic downturn since the Great 
Depression.  Professor Katyal’s quip that “efficiency is not the equivalent of 
wisdom” may be an accurate reflection of the times.188  Reliability, 
predictability, and protection from arbitrary game-changes might just be the 
new driving force.  These desires weigh against the consolidation of unitary 
power and shift the academic discussion back towards the protection of 
dispersed/expert administrative authority sheltered by the separation of 
powers doctrine. 
From the articles reviewed, efficiency, transparency, political 
accountability, and the concern for arbitrary action were in the forefront of 
the critiques.  As compared to the Reagan era, information flows more 
readily now in the age of the 24-hour news cycle where communication is 
viral and instantaneous.  We no longer need to rely on a single overseer to 
ensure government accountability when we are all watchdogs on Twitter.  If 
anything, the very real threat of obfuscation and secret directives used to 
evade the spread of unfavorable news belies the “transparent” and 
“politically accountable” narrative built to justify presidential control over 
the administrative state. 
The differences between the Reagan era—in which modern presidential 
control theory was conceived—and the apparent pushback of the current age 
may partially be explained by a shift away from an obsession with markets 
and “voodoo economics” of the past.  The public now has reason to distrust 
markets, and market speak may not be as compelling of an analogy as it once 
was.  If true, this would be a dramatic change from the market theology of 
the Reagan era that Rodgers described in Age of Fracture.  The modern 
critiques on Presidential Administration might be an indication that 
academics are once again tweaking their models in search of Vermeule’s 
“critical mass of acceptance”; while Rodgers’’ discussion illustrates the 
permeability between the public’s aggregate state of mind and the debates of 
academics and government officials.  Modern economic anxiety may have 
made the American public weary of unilateral and potentially arbitrary 
decision making—which may be reflected in the contemporary legal 
debates.
 188.  Katyal, supra note 73, at 2345. 
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Conclusion
Though unilateral presidential control may expedite the decision 
making process and “efficiency” of agencies, political accountability cannot 
justify presidential directives, or arbitrary policy changes and decision 
making of agencies.  Having a careful and thoughtful government is a good 
thing.  A deliberative process cannot, by its nature, be quick and easy.  
Efficiency cannot be the measuring stick of reasoned consideration. 
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